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Traditlonally private sector firms have been invited to tender for local 
authority contracts, for example to supply stationery, undertake major 
construction projects and install computer systems. Since 1980 local 
authorities have also been required to put out to tender most bulldlng, 
highways and maintenance work. The 1988 Local Government Act, however, 
extends compulsory competitive tendering to a wide range of services 
previously in the main supplied in-house by public sector employees or what 
are now usually referred to as ‘direct service organisations’ (DSO>. 
.v  This article considers why compulsory competitive tendering was introduced, 
considers the evidence on the benefits from competitive tenderlng, details 
the services affected, and discusses the consequences for local government. 
3 Whv compulsory competitive tenderinq, 
-c 
Since 1979 the Government has introduced a major programme of privatisation 
of which compulsory competitive tendering is a part. In its 1979 Manifesto 
the Conservative Party wrote: ‘The reduction of waste, bureaucracy and 
over-government will yield substantial savings... . . local direct labour 
schemes waste an estimated E400 million a year.. . ,’ Throughout the 1980s 
the Government has accused local authorlties of inefficiency in the 
provision of services. 
Yet apart from building, highways and maintenance work the Government 
eschewed direct intervention in local authority decisions on contracting. 
Instead, the Government advertised the cost savings that some authorities 
-. 
achieved by experimenting with competitive tendering. The most notable 
example was Southend-on-sea council in Essex which, following a competitive 
tender , contracted with a private company in 1981 to take over al 1 refuse 
and cleansing services. The reported saving was f 490,000 per annum. A 
similar level of saving was reported by Wandsworth council in southwest 
London. In February 1982 Wandsworth engaged Pritchard Industrial Services 
under a 5 year contract for street cleansing and shortly afterwards 
introduced private contractors for the provision of caretaking in pub1 ic 
ha1 Is, housing maintenance repairs and horticultural services. The cost 
savings resulting from competitive tendering are reputed to ’ have 
contributed significantly to Wandsworth’s ability to hold down its rates at 
a time of rate inflation in other London boroughs (Burnett, 1984). 
By 1984 councils which had put services out to competitive tender had made 
total savings for local taxpayers estimated by the Treasury to be in the 
region of f7 m (Treasury, 1984). In 1987/88 of authorities responding to 
the Local Government Chronicle (supplement, 8 July 1988) annual survey on 
competitive tendering, savings of f1,226,508 were identified, though some 
authorities reported minimal cost reductions and in the odd case increases. 
These savings came after major gains in labour productivity in local 
government following the squeeze on budgets from the mid-1970s. For 
example, a large rise in the volume of refuse to be collected in the four 
years to December 1984 coincided with an 18% reduction in local authority 
refuse collection staffing. This implies a previously high level of 
inefficiency in local authority services. 
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However, despite evidence of major financial gains, relatively  few councils  
resorted to competitive tendering. By early  1985 only 41 of 456 councils  
in England and W ales were reported to have chosen to use private 
contractors for any of their main serv ices, though a larger number had 
undertaken feasibility studies (Guardf an, 5 March 1985, p. 32). By the 
following year only 24 authorities had contracted-out refuse collection. 
Moreover, interest in the idea of competitive tendering in local government 
appeared to be declining. In part this resulted from the threat of 
-  industrial action by public sector trades unions whenever the subject was 
raised by councils. In further part it was a consequence of political 
It 1 
opposition to competitive tendering by the Labour Party. On ly  one Labour 
Delyn district council in W ales, introduced private ’ controlled authority, 
contractors to undertake refuse collection. A further reason, less easy to 
assess, was the c laim that competitive tendering led to a lower quality of 
serv ice. 
Frustrated by the unwillingness of most local authorities to experiment 
-c  
with competitive tendering, in 1985 the Government published a discussion 
\ 
I_- paper (Department of Environment, Competition fn the Provis ion of Local 
Authorf ty Servf ces, 1985). This  recommended legislation to force county, 
w.* 
district and parish councils  and joint authorities, joint boards, joint 
committees and s imilar local public bodies to put out to competition the 
provis ion of a number of serv ices -  including school meals  and other 
catering, refuse collection and street c leaning, the c leaning of schools  
and other public buildings and vehic le maintenance. The annual value of 
the serv ices involved was estimated to be f2.5 bn.. The Government also 
made it c lear that this list was provis ional and that competitive tendering 
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m ight eventually be extended to other areas including professional services 
such as arch1 tee ture, legal work, quantity surveylng, data processing and 
printing and the management of leisure facilities. 
Legislation on compulsory competitive tendering therefore arose because of 
the failure of most local authorities to react to what the Government saw 
8S overwhelming evidence of efficiency gains from  competition. The 
rationale for legislation was the same as the rationale for introducing the 
Poll Tax - to reduce waste in local government. Councils, lnc luding 
Conservative controlled authorities, reacted angrily, however, to what they 
interpreted as central government meddling in their decision making. The 
necessary legislation was therefore postponed until after the 1987 General 
Election but passed in 1988. 
Arguments surrounding competitive tendering 
The use of private contractors to provide services is part of a ‘Make or 
A buy’ decision. A decision made in the private sector on the basis of 
quality and cost. Private sector companies such as Rank Xerox and the 
M idland Bank contract out a wide range of non-‘core’ activities where it is 
more efficient to do so than supply in-house. Arguably, local authorities 
should adopt a sim ilar approach to contracting while taking into account 
any economic externalities and social goals. 
Specifically the claimed benefits of competitive tendering are as follows: 
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(1) Compet 1  t lve tendering makes the market for the provision of public 
goods and services periodically contestable. Competit ion to be  the service 
provider when contracts are lnltlally granted and later renewed drives down 
costs and maximises operat lng ef f lclency. By contrast, there is less 
incentive to seek out lower cost methods of working in monopoly DSOs where 
higher costs are met by taxpayers. The ’ public choice’ and ’ transaction 
cost’ literatures in economics point to inefficiency and opportunism in 
hierarchical public bureaucracies, leading to lnf lated government budgets 
with little incentive to economise in the use of labour and capital. Public 
sector emp loyees at all levels, it is alleged, pursue economic rents or 
dissipate rents through lower efficiency (Parker, 1985; M itchell, 1988). 
The introduction of competitive tendering enables management  to reform 
working practices, sometimes after lengthy and fruitless attempts to 
introduce reforms through normal bargaining procedures. As a  result of 
threatening to use outside contractors, Wandsworth Council in January 1981 
were able to shed 39 jobs and 9  vehicles saving over f400,OOO per annum. 
(2)Competltlve tendering divides service provision from quality regulation 
and facilitates the establishment of quality standards and effective 
policing. Where local authorities are the monopoly suppliers and regulators 
there is an  obvious conflict of interest. W ill a  supplier readily draw 
attention to inadequacies in its own services? Under competitive tendering 
the local authority can specify the quantity and quality of service in the 
contract, and enforce the contract terms through penalty clauses and 
performance bonds and by appointing alternative suppliers when the contract 
is renewed. Sanctions that were not open to them when they were dependent  
upon the in-house supplier. The  tendering process therefore generates 
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information about the service provided and 1 ts costs as well as providing 
incentive for the service to be supplied efficiently (Hartley, 1984, p.10). 
(3) Competitive tendering switches concern away from inputs towards 
monitoring outputs (both quantity and quality), Whereas local authorities 
have tended in the past to measure services in terms of numbers employed or 
amounts invested or spent, there is evidence that the introduction of 
. competitive tendering is associated with increased concern for outputs 
(Scul lard, 1989). The Association of Direct Labour Organisations has 
conceded in relation to the earlier 1980 Act on bui ldlng and maintenance 
contracting that the legislation led to ‘exposure to the idea that output 
is valued rather than costed.’ 
(4) Suppliers not limited in site by politically determined local authority 
boundaries can specialise and achieve economies of scale and scope (Blsh 
and Warren, 1972). The importance of this point depends, of course, upon 
the nature of the cost function for each local authority service. 
(5) Not only are there direct financial gains from the lower cost provision 
of services, but the Exchequer also gains indirectly. Private contractors 
pay taxes - both local and central - so that part of the eff lclency gains 
reflected in higher profits are recouped by government for taxpayers. 
These possible benefits from the introduction of competitive tendering need 
to be balanced against possible costs highlighted by the public sector 
trades unions. 
(1)Contrary to the view expressed earlier that competitive tendering brings 
benefits in terms of the specification and monitoring of outputs, critics 
suggest that where it has been adopted service quality has decl lned. The 
trades unions cite cases where following contracting out roads were poorly 
swept and dustbins were emptied less frequently. Also, they identify cases 
where private contractors have defaulted leaving councils with no service 
provision (TUC, 1984, 1986). Contractors might submit low tenders to win 
contracts, but once the DSO is disbanded hope to renegotiate prices. 
Such ‘contractor failures’ should not be ignored. On the other hand, most 1 
contracts appear to operate smoothly and failures appear to be on the 
--. decrease as tendering becomes established and private contractors gain 
experience in costing public services. A recent detailed study of 
contracting-out in the UK found no strong support for the claim that the 
qua1 1 ty of service had declined (Domberger et. al, 1986). While Milne (1987, 
p. 104) concludes: ‘The introduction of competitive tendering was used by 
management as a device to alter services that were thought had long needed 
changing. ’ Hartley also considers that changing contract specification is a 
.h 
benefit of competitive tendering (Hartley, 1988, p. 12). The wider argument 
regarding price escalation after the contract is awarded suggests that 
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contracts should be fixed price or at least have a cost reducing incentive 
scheme and cost-plus contracts should be avoided. Equally in this respect 
DSOs which win competitive bids should be subject to the same contractual 
condlt ions as the private bidders. DSOs should be no more able to raise 
their prices during the contract period than private contractors. In 
bidding for contracts the private and public sectors should have a level 
playing f leld. 
(2) Where private contractors are employed public sector trades unions 
point to reduced wages and employment benefits, such as sick pay and 
pensions, alongside poorer working conditions, redundancies and the use of 
C 
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casual labour (thus avoiding employment protection legislation and the 
payment of national insurance contributions) (Hastings and Levle, 1983). 
Only 8% of contract workers are unionised in the UK. In contrast, in 
certain parts of Western Europe there are much h 1 gher levels of 
unlonisatlon, which has led to national collective agreements with private 
employers on minimum wages and conditions. In Spain, Holland and Belgium 
workers have the right to keep their jobs when a new contractor takes over 
(Coyle, 1987). Also, in 1983 the government abolished the Fair Wages 
Resolution passed in 1946 and which in various forms dated back to 1891. 
I trequlred contractors to pay ’ fair wages’, usually interpreted as agreed 
union rates, In terminating the Fair Wages Resolution, the Government also 
had to revoke Convention 94 of the International Labour Organisation which 
states that: ‘While producers should be free to compete in matters of 
price, design, quality of product and service, it is unfair for competition 
to be based on a bidding down of workers’ wages’. The last dispute in the 
UK under the Fair Wages Resolution before its abolition had involved 
prlvatlsed refuse collectors in Wandsworth. 
A recent detailed study of eight cases in which catering services were put 
out to private contractors in the UK confirmed that in the newly 
liberalised market unskilled workers suffered. Generally they received 
lower pay in the form of bonus payments, time off and overtime, though not 
necessarily lower basic pay rates (Kelllher and McKenna, 1988). A study of 
contracting out refuse collection, however, suggested that in this service 
savings were more commonly achieved through greater productivity of labour 
and vehicles, involving substantial reductions in numbers employed, rather 
than through major cuts in wages and fringe benefits (Cubbln, et.al., 
1987). 
(3)Competitlve tendering for public service contracts is open to collusion 
between potential suppliers and even to out-right corruption of government 
off lclals. In the last decade a number of cases of ‘rigged’ tenders in the 
road building industry have been reported in which suppliers have agreed 
not to compete but instead to divide up the market. ’ Regulatory capture’ 
of local authority officials by contractors, as evidenced in public 
utilities in the USA (Parker, 1989) cannot be ruled out, especially where 
contracts do not go to the lowest bidder thus permitting ‘off lclal 
discretion’. What this argument seems to suggest, however, is that while 
local authorities may prefer to contract with establlshed operators which 
have a track record in the industry, to minimise the rlsk of collusion and 
corruption tenders should be open to all suppliers, including new entrants 
to the market. Also, once a decision is made the bids should be available 
for public inspection. Disappointingly, Hartley and Huby (1985) found that 
only 25% of local author1 ties in the mid-1980s had a policy of open 
competition. Instead bids tended to be restricted to members of established 
trade associations. 
(4)Competitlve tendering introduces administrative costs in terms of 
drawing up, negotiating and monitoring contract performance. The 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities estimated that DSO costs rose by 7% 
through the employment of more estimators, inspectors and technicians 
- 
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r equ i r ed  to  d e a l  wi th th e  prov is ions o f th e  1 9 8 0  Ac t. This  criticism  
a p p e a r s  to  imply,  h o w e v e r , th a t th e r e  a r e  n o  sim i lar costs w h e r e  D S O s  
o p e r a te . This  is n o t th e  case.  D S O s  h a v e  to  b e  m a n a g e d  a n d  superv ised,  
sta ff h a v e  to  b e  recru i ted a n d  p a i d . O fte n  th e s e  costs h a v e  b e e n  invisible, 
h i d d e n  a m o n g s t g e n e r a l  a d m inistrat ive expenses  ra th e r  th a n  re la ted  to  
d e p a r tm e n ta l  func tions . 
Pub l ic  vs. Pr ivate:  th e  ev ldenca  
Compu lso ry  c o m p e titive  te n d e r i n g  makes  m o s t economic  sense  if it resul ts in  
substant  l a1  ga ins  in  e f f lc lency. E ff ic lency can  b e  d e f l n e d  in  var ious  ways  
a n d  th e  ‘e ffect iveness o f serv ice de l ivery  m ight  b e  cons ide red  equa l l y  
impo r ta n t w h e r e  w e  a r e  d iscuss ing pub l ic  g o o d s . In  th e  stud ies  summar i sed  
b e l o w  a tte n tio n  has  cen t red u p o n  costs o f p rov is ion  th o u g h  s o m e  o f th e  
stud ies  a lso  a tte m p te d  to  con trol fo r  c h a n g e s  in  th e  qual i ty  o f service. 
T h e s e  stud ies  f rom th e  U K  a n d  e l sewhe re  con firm  th a t w h e r e  c o m p e titive  
te n d e r i n g  has  b e e n  in t roduced  th e r e  h a v e  b e e n  cons ide rab le  cost savings.  
T h e  ev idence  wh ich  w e  h a v e  r e g a r d i n g  cost sav ings in  th e  U K  comes  f rom th e  
A u d i t C o m m ission’s, extens ive rev iews o f c o m p e titive  te n d e r i n g  as  wel l  as  
f rom academic  research.  In  o n e  o f its ear l iest  c o m m e n tor les  th e  A u d i t 
C o m m ission d iscovered,  th r o u g h  recourse  to  th e  ‘Ross’ c o m p u te r  m o d e  1  
d e v e l o p e d  by  th e  Loca l  A u thor i t ies M a n a g e m e n t Serv ices  Adv isory  C o m m itte e , 
th a t con tracted-out  r e fuse  col lect ion serv ices h a d  lower  a v e r a g e  costs. T h e  
to p  2 5 %  o f D S O s  m a tch e d  th e s e  e fficiency  levels b u t th e r e  w e r e  w ide  
d i f ferences in  costs b e tween  th e  m o s t e fficie n t a n d  least e fficie n t 
counc i  1s. Cost  d i f ferences wh ich  cou ld  n o t b e  exp la ined  in  te rms  o f 
- 
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geography or service quality and frequency. The Commission concluded that 8 
out of 10 local authorities in England and Wales would benefit from  
contracting out services with potential total savings in the order of f30 
m . per annum (Audit Commission, 1984). Similar orders of cost savings from  
private contracting were reported in other Commission surveys. For example, 
up to f118 m . in vehicle maintenance expenses. In addition, the Commission 
also reported that the cost of re-wiring council properties varied between 
f2i8 and f396 per dwelling for private contractors but averaged f600 where 
DSOs were not subject to competition for contracts (Audit Commission, 1984, 
1987, p. 4). 
The trade association of contract cleaners has suggested an average saving 
in the order of 20% when cleansing services are subjected to competitive 
tendering (Hartley, 1986). Academic research broadly supports this figure. 
Hartley and Huby (1985) on the basis of a detailed questionnaire survey of 
local authorities and health authorities discovered that cost savings from  
competitive tendering for the same standard of service averaged 26%. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies in London reported only slightly lower 
f igures. Its study used regression analysis on data for 1983 to 1985 from  
305 local councils, including 19 which had private contractors and another 
10 which after competitive tenders retained the in-house service. The 
result was estimated average cost savings of around 22X where private 
contractors were used and 17% where the service was retained by a DSO. In 
addition, the study concluded that the bulk of the savings could be 
attributed to improvements in the physical productivity of labour and 
vehicles. The IFS found little evidence to suggest that the quality of 
service also declined (Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson, 1986, 1987). 
- 
Evidence of important financial savings from competitive tendering is not 
restricted to the UK. In a number of other countries the use of private 
contractors for public services is well established, especially in North 
America and Switzerland. A recent study of Canadian municipali ties by 
McDavid (1985>, in which private contractors had been introduced for 
residential waste collection, found that collection by DSOs was over 40% 
more expensive and that private collection crews were 95% more productive. 
In. large part this was due to the use of bigger capacity vehicles with 
smaller crews and the use of more efficiency bonuses, though there was also 
evidence of higher average wages in the public sector. Interestingly in 
McDavid’s sample both the highest single average co1 lection cost per 
household, $104, and the lowest, $8, occurred under private collection, 
suggesting that privatisation alone does not guarantee lower costs. 
Savings have also been reported in a series of studies of methods of refuse 
collection in the US. After surveying mixed residential waste services in 
2052 cities, covering one-third of the US population, collection costs were 
found to be on average 14% higher where municipal rather than private 
contractors were used (Savas, 1977) * This and McDavid’s results are 
supported by a number of other studies from North America (Hirsch, 1965; 
Pier, Vernon and Wicks, 1974; Kitchen, 19761, though Edwards and Stevens 
(1978) and Benne t t and Johnson (1979) d I scovered no statistically 
significant cost differences between the public and private sectors. Also 
in a survey of 103 Swiss tit ies in 1970, which included one-half of the 
Swiss population, residential refuse collection by private contractors was 
found to be on average 20% cheaper than public collection (Pommerehne amd 
Frey, 1977). 
4 
Evidently, cost savings are associated with the amount of competition for 
contracts. Savas, for instance, reports that in M inneapolis in 1971 a new 
sys tern of resident ial waste co1 let t ion was introduced, with one area 
continuing to be supplied by the municipal department and the other by a 
consort lum of private firms. Initially, the costs of the municipal 
department were 15% higher, but faced with the evidence from  the private 
sector that costs could be reduced, this disparity had disappeared by 1975. 
Similarly, McDavid (1985) provides the following costs per household for 
residential solid waste collection - municipal $42.29, private $28.02, but 
municipal collection in m l xed private-public systems $31.31. The 
introduction of competition can rejuventate sleepy public sector monopolies 
(cf. Primeaux, 1977; Savas, 1987, p.1251, a view supported by studies of 
pub1 ic vs private efficiency in industry and transport (Ml 1 lward and 
Parker, 1983), 
Turning to other services, there is also strong evidence that competition 
- 
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lowers costs. Marlin (1982) in a detailed review of local government in 
Japan reported a large number of cases where productivity increased 
sharply once private competition was substituted for public sector monopoly 
supply m  Forsyth sim ilarly chronicles numerous cases from  the US and the 
Europe where the introduction of private contractors led to savings of 
between 20% and 60%. The services involved included the replacement of 
sewers, road and pavement construction, window and office cleaning and the 
maintenance of golf courses and parks (Forsyth, 1980). Moreover, apparently 
even services often considered to be core public services such as bus 
transport, security and the fire service can be provided more cheaply with 
no necessary loss of effectiveness when the public sector loses its 
monopoly. 
In the case of fire services, Ahlbrandt (1973) calculated the costs of 
public provision in cities and fire districts in Seattle-King County and 
some cities in Washington state. The estlmated costs were contrasted with 
the costs of competitive supply in Scottsdale and other communities in 
- 
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Arizona. The results showed average fire protection costs of $7.10 per 
capita under public supply compared with $3.78 where private firms were 
used. A major cost advantage in favour of private sector provision was also 
discovered in Denmark. Here a private sector company, Pal ck, suppl les 
emergency fire services to almost one-half of the country’s population 
(Krlstensen, 1983). On the basis of a mu1 tlple regression model, pub1 lcly 
supplied fire protection was found to be almost three times more expensive 
than provision by Falck. In part the cause was economies of scale, with 
pub1 lc providers constrained in size by political boundaries. But 
competltlon was also a factor; Falck had an incentive to be efficient 
because it wanted to retain its position as the dominant private suppl ler. 
- In both the US and Danish examples efficiency improvements appeared to come 
from fuller utilisation of fire fighting equipment and more efficient 
- 
employment of labour, suggesting super lor knowledge of demand 
characteristics under private contracting. 
Turning to securl ty, although mainstream police services remain almost 
everywhere a public sector monopoly, many guard services are provided by 
the private sector. In the UK Securfcor and others protect money 
deliveries, patrol buildings and even protect military establishments 
- 
under contract . Gage (1982) in a study of guard services in Los Angeles 
County found that the cost was 34% higher when public sector personnel were 
employed to undertake the same work. In the case of express coach services, 
more competition from 1980 in the UK led to a fall in fares and the 
introduction of services which better reflected demand (Davis, 1984). 
National Express, the state owned operator, which previously held a 
monopoly on many routes, proved capable of markedly reducing its costs to 
stave off the competitive threat. More recent liberalisation of stage bus 
services in 1986 appears to be having a similar beneficial effect on local 
public transport (though some claim that service quality has suffered). The 
potential for dramatic cost savings is underlined by a study of bus 
services in West Germany cities. Oelert (1976) found public operators had 
costs on average 160% higher per kilometre than the private sector. 
In general, the international evidence (important studies are summarised in 
Figure 1) supports the Government’s view that competitive tendering can 
lead to considerable cost savings in the provision of local pub1 lc 
services. The international evidence further suggests, however, that it is 
competition rather than private ownership which matters. 
(Figure 1 around here>. 
The 1988 Local Government Act 
The 1988 Local Government Act makes competitive tendering compulsory for 
those services outlined in the earlier DOE discussion paper. It also 
empowers the Secretary of State to add to these ‘defined activities’ 
further services at a later date. On 1st July 1988 the Minister for Sport 
announced the introduction of an Order under the Act to include the 
management of sports centres for which competitive bids will be phased in 
after the main programme. At the same time a commitment was given to add no 
further services for the time being. Figure 2 provides full details of the 
- services included under the Act. 
(Figure 2 around here. ) 
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The 1988 Act extends competitive tendering across a wide range of local 
government services and takes effect from 1st August 1989. Most local 
authorities are included within its terms - including councils, New Town 
authorities and most police authorities (with special terms for the soon to 
be abolished Inner London Education Authority, New Towns and certain police 
bodies). These authorities are required to expose all functional work 
falling within the ‘defined activities’, unless below a de mfnfmfs 1 lml t, 
to competition by 1 August 1990 (except for ground maintenance work which 
must be subject to competition by 1 January 1990). In an attempt to ensure 
that contracts are not so large that private contractors with more limited 
capacity than DSOs are inhibited from competing effectively, competition is 
to be phased in at six monthly intervals over the next two and a half 
years. The Secretary of State has also laid down specified contract 
periods. Too long or too short a period could limit interest amongst 
private suppliers thus favouring the DSOs. These 1 lml ts vary for each 
function but range between 3 and 7 years with most being for 4 to 6 years. 
- 
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In the future a DSO will have to compete for work with the private sector 
and in some instances voluntary bodies and DSOs from other authorities. 
Under the Local Authorities (Goods and Services) Act 1970 local authorities 
are able to undertake work for each other and a number of councl Is intend 
to take the opportunity offered by the new regime of competitive tendering 
to compete outside their own boundaries. DSOs may therefore face 
competition not only from the private sector but from within the public 
set tor : It is not compulsory under the Act, however, for a council to give 
its own DSO or that of another authority the opportunity to bid for work; 
tenders for works contracts cannot be limited to the public sector. 
At the same time, DSOs will continue to be barred from competing for work 
in the private sector, on the grounds that having the cushion of taxpayers 
funds they do not face the same commercial risks as private firms. DSOs are 
therefore less able than private firms to expand their businesses and reap 
economies of scale and scope. 
The terms under which competitive tenders must be operated under the new 
legislation reflects experience from earlier contracting in local 
government and the NHS. In particular, the Department of the Environment is 
policing the tendering process to prevent anti-competitive clauses or 
conditions in council tender specifications which unduly favour DSOs. By 
September 1989 the Department was reported to be investigating over 150 
‘councils (roughly one-third of the total> after complaints about bias in 
favour of bids from in-house units (Economfst, 9 September, 1989, pp.35-6). 
Authorities which indulge in anti-competitive practices risk sanctions 
’ which could in appropriate cases lead to whole or partial closure of a 
- 
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DSO’ (DOE, 1988, p. 7). Anti-competitive behaviour is interpreted as 
‘anything which actually has the effect, or is intended or likely to have 
the effect of restricting, distorting, or preventing competition.’ (ibid, 
p. 61, For example, packaging contracts in such large amounts that private 
contractors are dissuaded from competing; giving contractors too little 
time to respond; requiring detailed and sensitive lnformat ion from 
companies which is not essential to the tendering process; requlr lng 
exctisslve performance bonds ; reject lng 1 ower tenders from private 
contractors in favour of DSOs wl thout good reason; and, more 
controversially, ’ taking into account any . . . non-commercial 
considerations’ such as the source of materials, contractors connections 
with South Africa, equal opportunities etc.. Employment of disabled persons 
and apprentices and trainees can, however, be taken into account (as 
permitted under the 1980 Act>. 
Where DSOs bid tenders must be open to competition and local authorities 
are required 3 to 6 months in advance of the tender date to provide 
detailed specifications for inspection free of charge and to supply copies 
for a reasonable charge. Where, however, al 1 contracts are automat lcal ly 
awarded to the private sector, inviting bids from a select list of 
contractors is permitted. In this case a mlnlmum of three private f lrms 
must be invited to bid. In so far as restricting the bidding limits 
competition, raises costs and, as discussed earlier, increases the risk of 
collusion and corruption, this provision in the Act is unfortunate. 
Annual reports and separate accounts must be kept for each financial year 
in respect of each ‘def lned activity’ carried out by a DSO. These must be 
- 
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audited and lodged with the Secretary of State and failure to do so could 
lead to sanctions. Accounts are to be drawn up in accordance with agreed 
accounting practices laid down by CIPFA, though the Secretary of State has 
reserve powers to determine further items to be included. One particularly 
contentious issue in earlier experiments with competitive tendering was the 
treatment of redundancy costs if DSOs were unsuccessful in winning bids. 
Under the Act local authorities may take into account the costs of making 
labour redundant in the first round of contracts by spreading the cost over 
the life of the contract. Authorities may not, however, consider redundancy 
costs again in future rounds of competition and thereby justify rejecting 
lower private tenders, since ‘this would appear to indicate that in-house 
costs are likely to remain above those of outside competitors indefinitely, 
and therefore the practice could be regarded as anti-competitive. (ibid, 
p.6. > 
Also, in setting its prices a DSO must include a 5% rate of return on 
capital employed based upon the current cost operating surplus (as earlier 
imposed for construction and maintenance work). This applies to all 
‘defined activities’, excluding building cleaning where, in recognition of 
the low amounts of capital employed, the financial requirement is break 
even. The rate of return requirement can also be amended where it would be 
inappropriate, for example where private contractors are used but the 
authority retains ownership of the capital assets. Critics of the Act argue 
that the requirement favours private contractors who can set their prices 
to provide a lower rate of return in the first instance, hoping to raise 
their profit margins when the contract is renewed. There is evidence that 
private contractors bid on a marginal basis simply to contribute to 
- 
- 
- 
overheads but without the expectatlon,in the short-term at least, of as 
high as a 5% return (Audit Commission, 1987, p. 7). 
Cnsequences for local goverm 
The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering poses a serious threat 
td the existence of the DSOs and thus to the provision of public services 
by local authorities. In response, however, the local authorities have 
begun to change their internal organisation and management with a view to 
winning competitive bids (Audit Commission, 1989). So far, and contrary to 
fears when the legislation was announced, they have been remarkably 
successful at fighting off private competition. A recent survey by the 
Municipal Journal (7 July 1989) showed DSOs winning around 80% of al 1 the 
contracts so far tendered; though, as observed already, some contractors 
have claimed foul play and the DOE is investigating. In part the success of 
the DSOs can be attributed to a lack of capacity and interest in the 
private sector in bidding for contracts. For many tenders the DSOs have 
been unopposed. Some potential contractors have chosen not to bid because 
of the costs of bidding, the prospect of working with a council opposed to 
competitive tendering and low profit margins in local authority work. But a 
further reason is the success of the DSOs in streamlining their operations 
and becoming more efficient. In particular, local authorities have begun to 
change in the following respects. 
(1) Culture 
A major change appears to be occurring in the ‘culture’ of local government 
leading to a move away from ‘bureaucratic’ and rule bound admlnlstrat ion. 
As economic theory predicts, exposure to competition is bringing a more 
‘commercial’ and market orientated approach to the management of public 
assets (Dunsire, et.al., 1988). To be capable of competing with private 
firms DSOs must be able to make decisions more quickly and with fewer 
pol ltlcal (and union) constraints. This has lmpllcatlons for their former 
pursuit of social objectives such as equal opportunities. 
(2) Organisation and management 
Competitive tendering requires a change in the internal organisation of 
local government. To avoid conflicts of interest, some local authorities 
are separating the client and contractor relationship wl thin their 
administrations, giving the activities to separate departments and officers 
and/or having the DSO report to a board which is separately constituted, if 
ultimately still responsible to the council’s Policy and Resources 
Comml ttee. This organisation reduces the risk of tenders won by DSOs being 
judged anti-competitive by auditors or the DOE. Committees, sub-committees 
and even whole local government departments might eventually disappear to 
be replaced by smaller and cheaper ‘contract management units’. 
(3) Employment 
The threat from competition requires a new flexlblllty in management. DSOs 
must now compete with private contractors whose wages and conditions of 
service reflect local labour market conditions. This implies a move away 
from centralised bargaining on pay and conditions and freedom for the 
management of DSOs to determine pay and manning levels. Wages for skilled 
workers in high demand may actually rise, whereas unsk 11 led wages are 
in contract design and inspection. Some lo 
Leeds, have planned a major investment in tra 
In the meant lme, management with the 
- 
- 
likely to fall. Moreover, some local government officials are having to be 
retrained from being ‘administrators’ to being managers with special skills 
cal authorities, for example 
lnlng over the next few years. 
necessary experience and 
qualifications is being attracted from the private sector to run DSOs. A 
number of councils are offering individually negotiated ‘executive’ salary 
p&ckages, lnc ludlng ’ fringe benefits’ such as cars and performance related 
pay0 but on fixed term contracts. This is similar to the way that senior 
management is recruited in the private sector and is well removed from the 
employment traditions of the public sector which it now threatens. The 
spread of individual salaries for senior managers alongside local market 
wages for the workforce poses a serious challenge to the role and influence 
of the public sector trades unions. 
- 
- 
- 
(4) Expansion or contraction? 
Should a local authority confine its DSOs to competing for existing work or 
should they be expanded to bid for contracts in other local authorities? 
Alternatively, should the DSOs be sold-off or disbanded? In so far as DSOs 
are moving to being arm’s length agencies of councils, the attraction of 
’ owning’ them must diminish. If they can no longer be vehicles for 
achieving wider political, economic and social goals why keep them in the 
pub1 lc set tor? A number of councils in recent months have considered 
’ prlvatlslng’ their DSOs through management and employee buy-outs of which 
to date there have been half a dozen (Economist, 9 September 1989, p.36). 
For example, in Bath the technical services DSO has gone private and within 
22 
- 
- 
,.- 
- 
a month had won over flm. of private sector contracts as well as work for 
the council. It has already become one of the largest employers in the 
city. Unsurprisingly, the attitude of councils towards the future of their 
DSOs reflects their political composition with Conservative councils, in 
general, more favourably disposed towards sell-offs. In contrast, some 
Labour controlled councils, such as Leeds and Sheff leld, have adopted 
strategies aimed at retaining as much work in-house as possible. Some 
authorities hope to expand their DSOs by competing for work elsewhere, 
though this involves taking a risk with taxpayers‘ funds, Failure will mean 
higher redundancy costs, frustrated expectations and a writing-off of the 
appreciable costs of preparing bids. To survive DSOs need to find a niche 
where they have a comparat lve cost advantage and this imp1 les 
specialisation rather than global expansion. 
(4) Improved accounting practices. 
Local authority accounting practices have allowed some DSOs to get around 
the threat from competitive tendering in the past. The Audit Commission 
(1987, p. 4) cites the case of : I.... one of the most notoriously 
inefficient [DSOsl in the country [which] shows a 10% Current Cost 
Accounting (CCA) return on its assets - better than all but the most 
efficient private building concerns’. Local authority auditors will as 
before be required to monitor value for money and look out for fraud and 
corruption. But under the 1988 Act they will also have to give a wrl tten 
opinion on the rate of return achieved by each DSO and confirm that the 
tendering system for contracts is in accordance with the legislation and 
fully competitive. 
- 
- 
\  
es 
- 
- 
In the past local authority accounting practices have left much to be 
desired, especially in terms of identifying, quantifying and allocating 
overheads and in terms of inventory control. This has meant that the costs 
of operating DSOs could be underrecorded, especially in terms of ‘support 
service’ costs, for example the provision of stationery, payroll 
admlnlstratlon etc.. Henceforth if such accounting is seen to favour ln- 
house bids for contracts councils could face penallties for antl- 
competitive pracrtlces. Local authorities are therefore having to undertake 
a rapid review of their accounting procedures. Also, to provide DSOs with 
up to date and continuous flows of relevant and timely information on 
revenues and costs, on-line computer systems are being installed. 
The Government justifies the introduction of compulsory competitive 
tendering for local services by pointing to cost savings and there appears 
to be ample evidence from the UK and overseas to support thls view. 
Monopoly supply by DSOs appears to be more expensive than supply by both 
public sector departments and private firms which face competition. The 
key, however, appears to be competition rather than ownership (see Figure 
3) * Interestingly, long-term uncompetitive private contracting, as existed 
for example in parts of the NHS up to the early 198Os, was associated with 
low efficiency (Ascher, 1987, p. 250). 
(Figure 3 around here. > 
c) ,. 
- 
The threat of competition appears to be having a galvanising ef feet upon 
councils leading to changes in organlsatlon and management ‘culture’ and 
this is paying-off in terms of winning tenders. To date compulsory 
competitive tendering is not producing the privatisation that public sector 
unions feared. This is not too surprising. Where DSOs have been subject to 
competition in the past, by shedding labour and revising working practices 
they have often succeeded in matching the private sector’s costs (Rogers, 
1987). 
Within local authorities major reorganisations are occurring to accomodate 
the effects of the new legislation. New management is being introduced and 
there is a new spirit of commercialism. In t lme more DSOs are 1 lkely to 
operate at ’ arm’s length’ from their counclllors and more management and 
employee buy-outs are likely. In raising efficiency, competitive tendering 
appears to be achieving what other reforms such as programme budgeting, 
management by objectives and efficiency audits failed to achieve over the 
last decade or so, 
- 
Figure 1 Summary of cost savings from private contracting for municipal 
Author(s) 
Ahlbrandt 
services 
Country Date Function 
USA 1973 Fire services 
(Scottdale, Arizona) 
Savas and Stevens USA 1975 Refuse collection 
Pommerhene & Frey Switzerland 1977 Refuse collection 
Blankart 
Hamada & Aoki 
Gage 
Kristensen 
West Germany 1979 
Japan 1981 
USA 1982 
(Los Angeles County) 
HcDavid 
Stevens 
Stevens 
Canada 1984 
USA 1984 
USA 1984 
Office cleaning 
Refuse collection 
Guard services 
Denmark 1983 Fire services 
Refuse collection 
Street cleaning 
Street paving 
Stevens 
World Bank 
USA 1984 
Developing 1984 
countries 
Off ice cleaning 
Road building 
& maintenance 
Hartley and Huby UK 1985 various local 
government & 
NHS domestic 
services 
Reported 
savings 
Government supply 89% more 
costly than supply by 
private contractors 
llunicipal collection 29% 
to 37% more expensive 
Private contract provision 
some 20% cheaper 
Public sector provision 
42% to 66% more expensive 
Municipal collection 124% 
more expensive 
County personnel 34% more 
costly than private 
contractors 
Public supply almost 300% 
more expensive than the 
private contractor 
Public collection 40% to 
50% more costly 
flunicipal cleaning 43% 
more expensive 
Hunicipal work 96% more 
costly than private 
contractors 
hunicipal cleaning 73% 
more expensive 
Government work around 60% 
more expensive than 
private contractors 
Competitive tendering 
produced savings averaging 
26%. 
(continued) 
Domberger, 
fleadowcroft and 
Thompson 
UK 
- 
Domberger, 
Pleadowcroft and 
Thompson 
UK 
Savas USA 
II i lne UK 
- 
- 
1986 refuse collection 
1987 NHS domestic 
services 
1987 commercial & public sector 38% to 45X 
administrative more expensive 
1987 NHS catering, 
domestic services 
1 laundry 
Competitive tendering 
reduces costs by around 
20% with no evidence that 
this is at the exepense of 
quality of service, 
Cost reductions of 20% 
achievable through 
competitive tendering 
Competition brought about 
savings of 33X to 66% 
Figure 2 
Services subject to compulsory competitive tendering under the 1988 Local 
Government AC t 
- Refuse collection: household and commercial waste. 
Building cleaning: excludes cleaning of dwellings, old people’s homes, 
children’s homes and police buildings. 
Other cleaning: covers street cleansing - including gully emptying; 
removal of litter from any land, not Just streets; 
emptying litter bins; and the cleaning of traffic 
signs and street name plates. 
Catering: covers all catering activities except school and 
welfare catering and catering at institutions of 
further and higher education. Also, specifically 
excludes the delivery of ‘meals on wheels’ and the 
preparation of meals and refreshments in special and 
residential establishments and day centres provided 
that the meals and refreshments are prepared on the 
premises. 
Maintenance of ground:including plant nursery work but excluding work 
- primarily in the nature of research or plant 
survival. 
Repair and maintenance 
of vehicles:but excludes repair of accident damage and the 
repair and maintenance of police vehicles and fire 
service vehicles. 
Sport and leisure 
management 
Source: Department of the Environment, Local Government Act 1988: Part 1 
and Schedule 1 Competition in the Frovisions of Local Authority Services, 
Circular 19/88. 
Notes: 
Sport and leisure management was added to the list of defined activities under the 1988 Act 
by Order on 1 July 1988, Competition for this activity will be phased in after the main 
programme is completed i,e, not before 1 January 1992, The Act empowers the Secretary of 
State to add further activities, subject to Parliamentary approval, though an assurance has 
been given that the Government has no intention to add further activities in the near future, 
There is a 02 ainieis limit, An activity is not to be treated as a defined activity in any 
financial year if the estimated gross cost, including overheads, of carying out that activity 
(not individual contracts) in-house in the previous year does not exceed flOO,OOO, 
Figure 3 Incentives exist to be efficient? 
Organisation: DSO private contractor 
Form of contract: - 
tlonopoly No (losses met from tax) No (cost inefficiency passed 
on in higher prices) 
Competitive 
I 
Yes (if cost escalation avoided) Yes 
- 
(assum ing no cartels) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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